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Abstract—The two-sender unicast index coding problem is the
most fundamental multi-sender index coding problem. The two
senders collectively cater to the demands of all the receivers,
by taking advantage of the knowledge of their side-information.
Each receiver demands a unique message and has some side-
information. Weakly secure index coding problem is a practical
version of the index coding problem in the presence of an
eavesdropper. The eavesdropper can not gain any information
about the messages he does not have, by listening to the senders’
transmissions. We provide constructions of weakly secure linear
codes for different classes of the two-sender unicast index coding
problem, using those of its sub-problems. The constructions
are valid only if such codes exist for all the sub-problems
under consideration. We identify some classes of the two-sender
problem, where the constructions provide optimal weakly secure
linear index codes.
I. INTRODUCTION
The index coding problem (ICP) introduced in [1] consists
of a single-sender which caters to the demands of all the
receivers by availing the knowledge of their side-information.
The sender transmits coded messages, which reduces the num-
ber of broadcast transmissions compared to the naive broadcast
of each message. In many practical scenarios, messages are
distributed over multiple senders due to data storage limits,
or due to erroneous reception of some messages. It can also
be strategically done to reduce end-to-end latency in content
delivery, as in multi-server coded caching [2]. Content can be
delivered using large storage capacity nodes called caching
helpers in cellular networks [3]. Data is also distributed and
stored over multiple nodes in distributed storage networks [4].
Hence, multi-sender index coding is an important component
of all the above mentioned problems, which exploit the knowl-
edge of receivers’ side-information, when the messages are
distributed over multiple senders.
A special class of multi-sender ICPs was first studied in [5],
where each receiver knows a unique message and demands
a subset of other messages. Inner and outer bounds for the
capacity region of many variations of multi-sender ICP were
provided in [6]–[9]. Existance of links with fixed finite capac-
ities from every sender to every receiver has been assumed in
contrast to the previous works. Variations of random coding
were used to provide the bounds. A fundamental class of multi-
sender ICP is the two-sender ICP, which was first studied
in [10]. Some single-sender index coding schemes based on
graph theory were extended to the two-sender unicast ICP
(TUICP), where each receiver demands a unique message.
Optimal broadcast rates of a special class of TUICPs, and
related code constructions using optimal codes of single-
sender sub-problems were studied in [11], [12], [13]. A more
practical version of the two-sender ICP is the secure ICP,
which arises in on-demand content delivery. The servers do
not want a particular client (or a set of clients) to gain any
information about any content it does not subscribe for. The
client gains access to the unsubscribed content by listening
to the transmissions of all the senders, which were intended
for the remaining clients. Many variations of the single-sender
secure ICP have been studied previously.
Single-sender ICP with security was first studied in [14].
An eavesdropper has a subset of messages and the transmitted
codeword. The objective of secure index coding is to encode
the messages such that the eavesdropper is unable to gain
information about a specified subset of messages it does not
have. Different levels of security were introduced. In weak
security, the eavesdropper is not able to obtain additional
information about each message he does not have. Block
security was introduced which generalizes the notion of weak
security. Necessary and sufficient conditions for a linear code
to be block secure were given. Some relations between the
minimum distance of the code, level of block security attained,
and the amount of side-information with the eavesdropper
were established. Strongly secure index coding was considered
in [15], where the eavesdropper does not have any side-
information, and must not gain any information about the
message set. This involves sharing random keys with only
the receivers, and encoding the messages along with these
keys. A necessary and sufficient condition for the existence
of weakly-secure index codes for any ICP has been given,
when the eavesdropper can access any subset of t messages
[16]. Three cases have been identified, where random keys
are not required to attain weak security. An equivalence
between secure network coding and secure index coding was
established in [17]. Capacity region of secure index coding is
characterised using an outer bound and an inner bound which
uses composite coding scheme [18]. In this paper, we study
the construction of weakly secure linear index codes for the
TUICP.
The key results of this paper are summarized as follows.
• We introduce the problem of two-sender unicast weakly
secure index coding against an eavesdropper having some
side-information. To the best of our knowledge, this is
the first work investigating the two-sender unicast index
coding problem with weak security.
• We provide a general construction of weakly secure
linear two-sender index codes for any general TUICP,
using weakly secure linear single-sender codes of its sub-
problems. The constructed codes need not be optimal.
However, this is the first work (to the best of our knowl-
edge) where weakly secure linear codes are constructed
using those of the sub-problems.
• Code-constructions are given for different classes of the
TUICP, using codes of the sub-problems. This establishes
upper bounds on the optimal codelengths of TUICPs.
• Some classes of the TUICP are identified, where the con-
structed codes are optimal. This result reduces the prob-
lem of finding two-sender optimal weakly secure linear
index codes to the problem of finding the corresponding
optimal codes of the single-sender sub-problems.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Sec-
tion II establishes the problem setup and provides required
definitions. Section III provides the main results of the paper.
Conclusion of the paper is provided in Section IV.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION AND DEFINITIONS
In this section, we formulate the problem of two-sender
unicast index coding with weak security and establish the
required notations and definitions used in this paper. We use
the notation employed in [13].
The set {1, 2, · · · , n} is denoted as [n]. Fq denotes a finite
field of q elements. Support of a vector u ∈ Fmq , denoted as
supp(u), is the set of co-ordinates where its components are
non-zero. For any matrix G, let 〈G〉 denote the row space of
G. A unicast ICP is an ICP where every receiver requests a
unique message. An instance of the two-sender unicast index
coding problem (TUICP) consists of two senders collectively
having the message set M = {x1, x2, · · · , xm}, where xi ∈
Fq, ∀i ∈ [m]. Each message xi is a realization of a random
variable Xi, i ∈ [m]. The random variables {Xi}i∈[m] are
assumed to be independent and uniformly distributed over Fq.
The jth sender denoted by Sj , j ∈ {1, 2}, has a subset of
M given by Mj , such that M1 ∪M2 = M. Each sender
knows the identity of all the messages present with the other.
We assume a noiseless broadcast channel. Transmissions of
each sender are orthogonal in time with those of the other.
There are m receivers, the ith receiver wanting xi and having
Ki ⊆M\{xi}, i ∈ [m], as its side-information. If M1 =M
and M2 = Φ, or vice-versa, the TUICP reduces to the single-
sender unicast ICP (SUICP).
For any unicast ICP, the knowledge of side-information
and demands of all the receivers is represented by the side-
information digraph D = (V(D), E(D)), with the vertex
set V(D) = {v1, · · · , vm}. The vertex vi represents ith
receiver which wants xi, i ∈ [m]. The edge set is given by
E(D) = {(vi, vj) : xj ∈ Ki, i, j ∈ [m]}. Any SUICP can also
be represented using a fitting matrix [19]. It contains unknown
entries denoted by x. Each row represents a receiver and each
column represents a message.
Definition 1 (Fitting Matrix, [19]). An m ×m matrix Fx is
called the fitting matrix of an SUICP described by the side-
information digraph D, where the (i, j)th entry is given by ‘x’
if xj ∈ Ki, 1 if i = j, and 0 otherwise, for all i, j ∈ [m].
The TUICP has been analyzed using three sub-digraphs
(equivalently sub-problems) induced by three disjoint vertex
sets of the side-information digraph [11], [13]. We recapitulate
the same, as we employ the same approach. Let P1 = M1 \
M2 and P2 = M2 \ M1 denote the message sets available
only with S1 and S2 respectively. The messages known to
both the senders are given by P{1,2} = M1 ∩ M2. Let
mT = |PT |, for any non-empty set T ⊆ {1, 2}. Any singleton
set is represented without {}. Let P = (P1,P2,P{1,2}). Any
TUICP I can now be described in terms of the two tuple
(D,P), as I(D,P).
Let DT be the sub-digraph of D, induced by the vertices
{vj : xj ∈ PT , j ∈ [m]}, for any non-empty set T ⊆ {1, 2}.
If there exists an edge from some vertex in V(DT ) to
some vertex in V(DT ′), in the digraph D, for non-empty
T , T ′ ⊆ {1, 2}, T 6= T ′, an interaction is said to exist
from DT to DT ′ , denoted as DT → DT ′ . The interaction
DT → DT ′ is said to be fully-participated, if there are
edges from every vertex in V(DT ) to every vertex in V(DT ′).
Otherwise, it is said to be partially-participated. The TUICP
is said to have fully-participated interactions if all the existing
interactions are fully-participated. Consider the digraph H
with V(H) = {1, 2, {1, 2}} and E(H) = {(T , T ′)|DT →
DT ′ , T , T
′ ∈ V(H)}. We call the digraphH as the interaction
digraph of the digraph D, for a given P . Bidirectional edges in
interaction digraph are denoted by a single edge with arrows at
both the ends. There are 64 possibile interaction digraphs given
in Figure 1, which were enlisted and classified in [11]. The
vertex representing the set {1, 2} is written as 12 for brevity.
Note that all the possible interaction digraphs are classified
into two cases broadly: Case I and Case II. Case I consists
of all acyclic digraphs. Case II was further classified into five
subcases as shown in Figure 1.
For a given instance of the TUICP, a two-sender index
code consists of two sub-codes transmitted by the two senders
respectively. Let x(T ) be the concatenated message vector of
messages in PT , for non-empty T ⊆ {1, 2}. The random
vectors XT are defined similarly. An encoding function for
Sj is given by Ej : F
|Mj|×1
q → F
lj×1
q , such that cj =
Ej(x(j),x({1,2})), where lj is the length of the codeword cj ,
j ∈ {1, 2}. The ith receiver has a decoding function given by
Di : F
(l1+l2+|Ki|)×1
q → Fq , such that xi = Di(c1, c2,Ki),
i ∈ [m], i.e., it can decode xi using its side-information
and the received codewords c1 and c2. An index code for
a two-sender problem is said to be linear, if both the encod-
ing functions are linear transformations. In general, a linear
code seen by any receiver can be written as in (1), where
x = (x1, x2, · · · , xm)
T ∈ Fm×1q is the concatenated message
vector. The matrix G is an l×m matrix, where l = l1 + l2 is
the codelength of the two-sender index code.
Gx =
(
G1 0 G
1
{1,2}
0 G2 G
2
{1,2}
)
 x(1)x(2)
x
({1,2})

 . (1)
G is also called an encoding matrix of the problem. The
constituent matrices have appropriate sizes as seen from the
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Fig. 1: Enumeration of all the possible interactions between the sub-digraphs D1, D2, and D{1,2}, given by the digraph H.
partition of G in (1). Si sends Gix
(i) + Gi{1,2}x
({1,2}),
i ∈ {1, 2}. Depending on the two-sender problem, any of the
matrices Gi{1,2}, i ∈ {1, 2}, can be 0.
We now consider the notion of weak security in the TUICP
setup. For any B ⊂ [m], let xB = {xi : i ∈ B}. There is an
eavesdropper having a subset of messages xA, with A ( [m],
and having access to the codewords transmitted by the two
senders. The set A is an element of the set U ⊂ 2[m] (2[m]
is the set of all subsets of [m]). The set U consists of sets of
indices of possibly compromised messages. The senders know
the set U , but not the particular set A. That is, the senders
do not know the particular xA accessed by the eavesdropper,
unless |U| = 1.
A weakly secure linear index code must ensure that all
the receivers are able to obtain their demands, and also
that the eavesdropper does not gain additional information
about each message not present in xA. That is, assuming
the encoding functions {Ej}j∈{1,2} to be linear transforma-
tions, H(Xi|E1(X(1),X({1,2})),E2(X(2),X({1,2})),XA) =
H(Xi), for all i ∈ A
c. H(X) and H(W |X,Y,Z) de-
note shannon entropy and conditional entropy. For a TUICP
I(D,P), consider A = A1 ∪ A2 ∪ A{1,2}, such that xAT =
xA∩xPT , for non-empty T ⊆ {1, 2}. That is, xAT is the side-
information of the eavesdropper present in PT . We denote this
instance of the weakly secure TUICP as I(D,P ,A). Similarly,
an SUICP with eavesdropper’s side-information given by A
is denoted as I(D,A). The optimal (minimum) length (over
a given field) of a weakly secure linear index code for
the problem I(D,P ,A) is denoted as l∗(I(D,P ,A)). For
I(D,A), it is denoted as l∗(I(D,A)). When there is no
ambiguity and the given problem is understood, we write l∗
instead of l∗(I(D,P ,A)) for brevity. Similarly, the optimal
codelength of the subproblem l∗(I(DT ,AT )) is denoted as
l∗T , for non-empty T ⊆ {1, 2}.
The following notations are required for the construction of
a two-sender code from single-sender codes. Any vector ux
with a subscript x consists of 1’s, 0’s and x’s. An x denotes an
unknown value, which can be replaced by any element from
the given field. A vector u is said to complete a vector ux and
denote it as u ≈ ux, if u can be obtained by replacing the x’s
in ux with known values from the given field. A vector e
(i,m)
xA
is a 1×m vector with 1 in the ith co-ordinate, x’s in the co-
ordinates given by A, and 0’s in the rest of the co-ordinates.
The ‘x’s in e
(i,m)
xA denote unknown values. Let c1 and c2 be
two codewords. The notation c1+c2 denotes the symbol-wise
addition of c1 and c2 after zero-padding the shorter message
at the least significant positions to match the length of the
longer one. The notation c[a : b] denotes the vector obtained
by choosing the code symbols from co-ordinate a to b, starting
from the most significant position. Similar notation holds for
codes C1 and C2.
We now illustrate the definitions and notations introduced
in this section with a running example.
Example 1. Consider the TUICP withm = 4 messages, where
the ith receiver demands xi ∈ F2, i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}. Sender S1
hasM1 = {x1, x2, x3}. S2 hasM2 = {x3, x4}. Hence, P1 =
{x1, x2}, P2 = x4, and P{1,2} = x3. The side-information of
each receiver is given as follows: K1 = x2, K2 = x1, K3 =
{x2, x4}, K4 = {x2, x3}. The side-information digraph D and
the corresponding interaction digraphH are shown in Figure 2.
The vertex-induced sub-digraphs D1, D2, and D{1,2} are also
shown. Note that only the interactionsD{1,2} → D2 and D2 →
D{1,2} are fully-participated. The interaction digraph shown in
Figure 2 isH50 as given in Figure 1. Let the eavesdropper have
message set {x3, x4}. Hence, A = {3, 4}. and A1 = Φ,A2 =
4,A{1,2} = 3. Consider the code C = (x1 + x2, x3 + x4). It
can be easily seen that the eavesdropper cannot decode each
of x1 and x2. In Lemma 4.3, [14], it has been shown that
under the assumption of linear encoding, the eavesdropper is
not able to gain any information about a particular message iff
it is not able to decode it. Hence, the code is weakly secure.
Note also that the eavesdropper has some joint information
about x1 and x2, even though it is not able to decode either.
14
2
3
D
1
12
2
H50
3 4
1 2
D{1,2} D2
D1
Fig. 2: Side-information digraph, interaction digraph, and sub-
digraphs of Example 1
The encoding matrix G is shown below.
G =
(
1 1 0 0
0 0 1 1
)
,G1 =
(
1 1
)
,G2 =
(
1
)
,
G
1
{1,2} =
(
0
)
,G2{1,2} =
(
1
)
.
III. MAIN RESULTS
In this section, we use weakly secure linear codes of the
single-sender sub-problems to obtain a weakly secure linear
code for the two-sender problem. The code-constructions given
in this section assume the existence of weakly secure linear
index codes for all the related sub-problems.
We recapitulate the following lemma given as a special case
of Lemma 4.3 in [14], which gives the necessary and sufficient
conditions for a linear index code to be weakly secure.
Lemma 1 (Lemma 4.3, [14]). Let the sender transmit Gx,
where G ∈ Fl×mq and x ∈ F
m×1
q . For each i ∈ A
c, an eaves-
dropper having xA, and receiving Gx, has no information
about xi iff the following holds.
∀u : supp(u) ⊆ A, u+ ei /∈ 〈G〉. (2)
In Lemma 2, we state a necessary and sufficient condition
equivalent to that given in Lemma 1.
Lemma 2. Let an index code be given by the encoding matrix
G ∈ Fl×mq , and the eavesdropper have xA, and have access
to the index code. For each i ∈ Ac, an eavesdropper receiving
Gx, has no information about xi iff the following holds.
∄ d ∈ F1×lq : dG ≈ e
(i,m)
xA
. (3)
Proof. A vector u + ei is in the the row space G, iff there
exists a d, such that dG = u + ei. From, the definition of
e
(i,m)
xA , the condition given in (2), is hence equivalent to that
given in (3). Hence the result. 
The condition (2) is equivalent to the condition (3). The
proofs of Lemmas 3, 5, and 7, and Theorems 1 and 2 become
easier and transparent when condition (3) is employed instead
of condition (2). Lemmas 1, and 2 are derived for the single-
sender ICP. However, they also hold for the TUICP, as the
overall transmitted code can be seen in the form of Gx, as in
(1). We illustrate Lemma 2 with an example.
Example 2 (Example 1 continued). Note that for the encoding
matrix given in Example 1, the following are the possible
values of dG: (1 1 0 0), (0 0 1 1), (1 1 1 1), (0 0 0 0). For
A = {3, 4}, i takes values from Ac = {1, 2}. The possible
values of e
(i,4)
xA are (1 0 x x) and (0 1 x x). With the binary
field, the possible values for any vector v such that v ≈ e
(1,4)
xA
are (1 0 0 0), (1 0 0 1), (1 0 1 0), (1 0 1 1). The possible
values for any vector v such that v ≈ e
(2,4)
xA are (0 1 0 0),
(0 1 0 1), (0 1 1 0), (0 1 1 1). Note that none of the possible
values of dG are same as any of the eight vectors which
complete e
(i,4)
xA , for i ∈ {1, 2}. Hence, the code obtained is
weakly secure.
The following result shows that a linear weakly secure index
code for any SUICP can be obtained by code concatenation
of corresponding codes of its subproblems.
Lemma 3. Consider an SUICP I(D,A) with the fitting matrix
Fx of size m×m as given in (4), where F
(i)
x is the mi×mi
fitting matrix of an SUICP I(Di,Ai), i ∈ {1, 2}, such that
m1 +m2 = m. Let the eavesdropper have the message index
set A = A1 ∪ A2, with A1 ⊂ [m1], and A2 ⊂ [m] \ [m1].
Fx =
(
F
(1)
x B
(1)
x
B
(2)
x F
(2)
x
)
(4)
If l∗i is the optimal codelength, and Gi a corresponding
encoding matrix for the problem I(Di,Ai), i ∈ {1, 2}, then
the optimal codelength l∗ for the problem I(D,A) is upper
bounded by l∗1 + l
∗
2 , and a corresponding encoding matrix is
given by G as in (5).
G =
(
G1 0
0 G2
)
(5)
Proof. We prove the lemma by obtaining a contradiction.
From Lemma 2, we know that
∄ di ∈ F
1×li
q : diGi ≈ e
(ji,mi)
xAi
, ∀ji ∈ [mi], ∀i ∈ {1, 2}. (6)
Using Lemma 2, if G is not resulting in a weakly secure code,
then we have
∃ (d1|d2) ∈ F
1×(l1+l2)
q : (d1G1|d2G2) ≈ e
(j,m)
xA
.
This implies that (6) is violated for atleast one of i ∈ {1, 2},
which contradicts that atleast one Gi will result in a weakly
secure code for the problem I(Di,Ai). 
A. A General Code-construction for any TUICP
We now provide a general construction of weakly secure
linear codes for any TUICP in terms of weakly secure linear
codes of its single-sender sub-problems. A weakly secure
linear code need not exist for a given SUICP. Hence, the
construction is valid only if such codes exist. The two-sender
problem can also have partially-participated interactions.
Theorem 1. Consider any TUICP I(D,P ,A) with any type of
interactions. Let P{1,2} be partitioned into two disjoint sets:
P
(1)
{1,2} and P
(2)
{1,2}. The induced sub-digraph of D induced by
the message set P˜i = P
(i)
{1,2}∪Pi, is denoted by D˜i, i ∈ {1, 2}.
Let the eavesdropper have side-information xA = xA˜1 ∪ xA˜2 ,
where xA˜i = xA ∩ P˜i, i ∈ {1, 2}. If there exists a weakly
secure linear index code C˜i for each SUICP I(D˜i, A˜i), i ∈
{1, 2}, then the code C = (C˜1, C˜2) is a weakly secure linear
index code for the TUICP I(D,P ,A).
Proof. The code C˜i can be written as G˜ix˜i, i ∈ {1, 2}, where
G˜i is an li × |P˜i| matrix, with x˜i being the concatenated
message vector of messages in P˜i. Consider the code (C˜1, C˜2)
given in (7), obtained from the given codes.
Gx =
(
G˜1 0
0 G˜2
)(
x˜1
x˜2
)
(7)
All the receivers are able to decode their demands. We
now prove that the code is also weakly secure against the
eavesdropper by contradiction. Assume that there exists a
vector d = (d1|d2) ∈ F1×lq , with di ∈ F
1×li
q , i ∈ {1, 2},
such that dG = (d1G˜1|d2G˜2) ≈ e
(j,m)
xA , for some j ∈ A
c.
If j ≤ |P˜1|, then we have d1G˜1 ≈ e
(j,|P˜1|)
xA˜1
. Otherwise we
have, d2G˜2 ≈ e
(j−|P˜1|,|P˜2|)
xA˜2
. In both the cases, this leads
to a contradiction as there must not exist such d1 (or d2
if j > |P˜1|), due to our assumption of the codes given by
the matrices {G˜i}i∈{1,2} being weakly secure, according to
Lemma 2. Hence the result. 
We illustrate the theorem with an example.
Example 3. Consider the following TUICP with M1 =
{x1, x2, x3, x4, x5, x6}, and M2 = {x5, x6, x7, x8, x9}.
Hence, P1 = {x1, x2, x3, x4}, P2 = {x7, x8, x9}, and
P{1,2} = {x5, x6}. The ith receiver demands xi, i ∈
{1, 2, · · · , 9}. The side-information of each receiver is:
K1 = {x2, x3},K2 = {x3, x4},K3 = {x4, x5},
K4 = {x5, x1},K5 = {x1, x2},K6 = {x7, x8},
K7 = {x8, x9},K8 = {x9, x6},K9 = {x6, x7},
The eavesdropper has side-information given by xA =
{x2, x5, x6, x8}. Hence, A1 = {2},A2 = {8},A{1,2} =
{5, 6}. Consider P
(1)
{1,2} = x5, and P
(1)
{1,2} = x6. Hence,
P˜1 = {x1, x2, x3, x4, x5}, and A˜1 = {2, 5}. It can be easily
verified that the following are valid codes for I(D˜i, A˜i),
i ∈ {1, 2}.
C˜1 = (x1 + x2 + x3, x2 + x3 + x4, x3 + x4 + x5),
C˜2 = (x6 + x8, x7 + x9).
We now state a result for any TUICP (for the sake of
completeness) with any type of interactions, which also holds
for Cases I and II-A, without proof. The proof follows on the
same lines as that of Theorem 1.
Corollary 1 (Naive scheme). Consider any TUICP I(D,P ,A)
with any type of interactions. If there exists a weakly secure
linear code CT , for the problem I(D,AT ), for all non-empty
T ⊆ {1, 2}, then the linear code C = (C1, C2, C{1,2}) is weakly
secure for the TUICP I(D,P ,A).
Remark 1. The weakly secure linear index code given in
Theorem 1 need not be optimal in general.
B. Code-constructions for some classes of the TUICP belong-
ing to Cases II-B,II-C,II-D, and II-E
For the remainder of this section, let CT be an optimal
weakly secure linear code for the problem I(DT ,AT ), for
all non-empty T ⊆ {1, 2}. We now state and prove the result
for Case II-B.
Theorem 2 (Case II-B). Consider any TUICP I(D,P ,A), with
the interactions Di ← D{1,2} and D{1,2} ← Di, for all i ∈
{1, 2}, being fully-participated, and belonging to Case II-B. If
weakly secure linear index codes exist for I(DT ,AT ), for all
non-empty T ⊆ {1, 2}, the optimal codelength l∗(I(D,P ,A))
satisfies l∗ ≤ max{l∗{1,2}, l
∗
1 + l
∗
2}.
Proof. We consider the code-construction of classical index
codes (without weak security restriction) given in the proof of
Theorem 7, in [11]. Then, we substitute optimal weakly secure
linear codes in the place of classical index codes given in
the construction and show that the resulting code is a weakly
secure linear code. There are four sub-cases as follows: (i)
l∗{1,2} ≥ l
∗
1 + l
∗
2, (ii) l
∗
{1,2} ≥ max{l
∗
1, l
∗
2}, (iii) l
∗
{1,2} ≤
l∗1, and (iv) l
∗
{1,2} ≤ l
∗
2 . We mention the code-construction
presented in [11] for all the sub-cases, but prove the theorem
only for sub-case (i). The proofs for other sub-cases follow
on similar lines.
Code construction for sub-cases (i) and (ii): C1+C{1,2}[1 :
l∗1] transmitted by S1, and C2+C{1,2}[l
∗
1+1 : l
∗
{1,2}] transmitted
by S2. Code construction for sub-case (iii): C1 + C{1,2}
transmitted by S1, and C2 transmitted by S2. Code construction
for sub-case (iv): C2 + C{1,2} transmitted by S2, and C1
transmitted by S1.
Proof for sub-case (i): It has been shown that all the
receivers are able to decode their demands from the given
code in [11]. Consider any encoding matrix GT of the code
CT , for all non-empty T ⊆ {1, 2}. Let M
[a:b], denote the
matrix obtained by taking consecutive rows starting from ath
row to bth row of the matrix M. It can be easily verified that
the overall encoding matrix G can be written as shown in (8).
G =


G1 0 G
[1:l∗
1
]
{1,2}
0 G2 G
[l∗
1
+1:l∗
1
+l∗
2
]
{1,2}
0 0 G
[l∗
1
+l∗
2
+1:l∗{1,2}]
{1,2}

 (8)
It can be easily shown (as shown in the proof of Theorem
1), that there does not exist any vector d ∈ F
l∗{1,2}
q , such that
dG ≈ e
(j,m)
xA , for any j ∈ A
c. If such a vector exists, it
leads to the contradiction that atleast one of the codes of the
subproblems is not weakly secure linear, according to Lemma
2. Hence, the code-construction yields a weakly secure linear
code for the TUICP. 
We state the results for Cases II-C, II-D and II-E without
proof. The proofs follow on similar lines as that of Theorem
2. The code-construction for Cases II-C and II-D is based on
the code-construction of classical index codes (without weak
security restriction) given in the proof of Theorem 8, in [11].
Corollary 2 (Case II-C). Consider any TUICP I(D,P ,A),
with the interactions D1 ← D{1,2} and D{1,2} ← D1 being
fully-participated, and belonging to Case II-C. If weakly se-
cure linear index codes exist for I(DT ,AT ), for all non-empty
T ⊆ {1, 2}, the optimal codelength l∗ ≤ max{l∗{1,2}, l
∗
1}+ l
∗
2.
The code-construction giving this bound is given as: C1+C{1,2}
transmitted by S1, and C2 transmitted by S2.
The result for Case II-D follows from that of Case II-C,
by observing that the interaction digraphs of Case II-D are
obtained by interchanging the labels 1 and 2 of the vertices in
the corresponding interaction digraphs of Case II-C. Hence,
we have the following result.
Corollary 3 (Case II-D). Consider any TUICP I(D,P ,A),
with the interactions D2 ← D{1,2} and D{1,2} ← D2 being
fully-participated, and belonging to Case II-D. If weakly se-
cure linear index codes exist for I(DT ,AT ), for all non-empty
T ⊆ {1, 2}, the optimal codelength l∗ ≤ max{l∗{1,2}, l
∗
2}+ l
∗
1.
The code-construction giving this bound is given as: C2+C{1,2}
transmitted by S2, and C1 transmitted by S1.
The result of the following corollary depends on the code-
constructions given in [13] (for sub-cases (i) and (ii) given
in the following corollary) and [11] (for sub-case (iii)).
Corollary 4 (Case II-E). Consider any TUICP I(D,P ,A),
with fully-participated interactions, and belonging to Case II-
E. If weakly secure linear index codes exist for I(DT ,AT ),
for all non-empty T ⊆ {1, 2}, the optimal codelength l∗ ≤
max{l∗{1,2} + l
∗
1 , l
∗
{1,2} + l
∗
2 , l
∗
2 + l
∗
1}. The code-construction
giving this bound depends on three sub-cases:
(i) If l∗1 ≤ min{l
∗
2, l
∗
{1,2}}, send C1 + C{1,2}[1 : l
∗
1] by S1,
C2 + C{1,2}[1 : l
∗
1 ] by S2, C{1,2}[l
∗
1 + 1 : l
∗
{1,2}] by S1 or S2.
(ii) If l∗2 ≤ min{l
∗
1, l
∗
{1,2}}, send C1 + C{1,2}[1 : l
∗
2] by S1,
C2 + C{1,2}[1 : l
∗
2 ] by S2, C{1,2}[l
∗
2 + 1 : l
∗
{1,2}] by S1 or S2.
(iii) otherwise, send C1 + C{1,2} by S1, C2 + C{1,2} by S2.
Remark 2. Note that the results in this subsection provide
non-trivial upper bounds on the optimal weakly secure index
codelength using the code construction given in [13].
C. A necessary condition for optimality of the construction
In this subsection, we obtain a necessary condition for the
optimality of the codes constructed in the previous subsection.
From Corollary 4.5 given in [14], we know that any en-
coding matrix of any SUICP is obtained by replacing all the
unknown entries of the fitting matrix of the SUICP with known
entries from the field, and then taking any row basis of such
a matrix. We state it here for easy reference.
Lemma 4 (Corollary 4.5, [14]). An r × m matrix G gives
a valid index code for a given SUICP iff for all i ∈ [m],
there exists a vector ui ∈ Fmq , satisfying (i) supp(ui) ⊆ χi,
where χi is the set of indices of messages in Ki, and (ii)
ui + ei ∈ 〈G〉, where ei is the standard basis vector in Fmq
with 1 in the ith co-ordinate and 0’s in other co-ordinates.
The following lemma provides an optimal weakly secure
linear index code for an SUICP, whose side-information di-
graph can be partitioned into two vertex-disjoint sub-digraphs
with no edges from one sub-digraph to the other or vice-versa.
Lemma 5. Consider an SUICP I(D,A) with the fitting matrix
Fx of size m×m as given in (9), where F
(i)
x is the mi×mi
fitting matrix of an SUICP I(Di,Ai), i ∈ {1, 2}, such that
m1 +m2 = m. Let the eavesdropper have the message index
set A = A1 ∪ A2, with A1 ⊂ [m1], and A2 ⊂ [m] \ [m1].
Fx =
(
F
(1)
x 0
0 F
(2)
x
)
(9)
If l∗i is the optimal codelength, and Gi a corresponding
encoding matrix for the problem I(Di,Ai), i ∈ {1, 2}, then
the optimal codelength l∗ for the problem I(D,A) is l∗1 + l
∗
2,
and a corresponding encoding matrix is given by G as in (10).
G =
(
G1 0
0 G2
)
(10)
Proof. From Lemma 4, we know that any encoding matrix
(not necessary optimal) for the problem I(D,A) must be of
the form given in (10), with li ×mi matrices Gi, i ∈ {1, 2}.
Using Lemma (2), for a weakly secure linear code we must
have the following for any j ∈ Ac.
∄ (d1|d2) ∈ F
1×(l1+l2)
q : (d1G1|d2G2) ≈ e
(j,m)
xA
. (11)
This implies (12), which is the condition for weak security for
the individual encoding matrices Gi of problems I(Di,Ai),
i ∈ {1, 2}, according to Lemma 2. Hence minimizing l1+l2 is
equivalent to minimizing each li, i ∈ {1, 2}. Thus the result.
∄ di ∈ F
1×li
q : diGi ≈ e
(ji,mi)
xAi
, ∀ji ∈ [mi], ∀i ∈ {1, 2}.
(12)

We now use Lemma 5, to obtain an optimal weakly secure
linear code for a special case of the TUICP, which is then used
in Theorem 3 to show the optimality of the code-constructions
given in the previous subsection (Theorem 2 and Corollaries
2-4).
Lemma 6. Consider any TUICP I(D,P ,A) with any type of
interactions and P{1.2} = Φ. We have l
∗ = l∗1 + l
∗
2 .
Proof. Let the senders send the codewords ci, i ∈ {1, 2}. As
c1 is only a function of messages in P1, the receivers in D1 can
not make use of their side-information present in D2, and vice-
versa. Hence, it is equivalent to a single-sender problem with
receivers in Di not having any side-information in D{1,2}\i,
i ∈ {1, 2}, and the sender having P1 ∪ P2. Now using the
result of Lemma 5, we obtain the result of this lemma. 
In the following lemma, we obtain a lower bound on the
optimal codelength of a special class of the TUICP using that
of a sub-problem.
Lemma 7. Consider any TUICP I(D,P ,A) with any type of
interactions and A{1,2} = P{1,2}. Consider another related
problem I(D′,P ′,A′), where P ′ = (P1,P2,Φ), A
′ =
(A1,A2,Φ), and D
′ is the induced sub-digraph of D in-
duced by the messages in P ′. Then, l∗(I(D′,P ′,A′)) ≤
l∗(I(D,P ,A)).
Proof. Without loss of generality, we consider an optimal
encoding matrix for I(D,P ,A) to be of the following form.
G =
(
G1 0 G
1
{1,2}
0 G2 G
2
{1,2}
)
. (13)
From Lemma 2, we have the following (assuming Gi has li
rows, i ∈ {1, 2}).
∄ (d1|d2) ∈ F
1×(l1+l2)
q :
(d1G1|d2G2|d1G
1
{1,2} + d2G
2
{1,2}) ≈ e
(i,m)
xA
.
Hence, we have the following.
∄ di ∈ F
1×li
q : diGi ≈ e
(ji,mi)
xAi
, ∀ji ∈ [mi], ∀i ∈ {1, 2}.
(14)
Thus using Lemma 4, the matrix G′ =
(
G1 0
0 G2
)
is
an encoding matrix for the problem I(D′,P ′,A′). Hence the
result. 
Remark 3. Note that in the classical index coding problem
optimal codelength of any subproblem (of a given problem) is
not more than that of the original problem. This is not proved
in general for the case of weakly secure index coding problem.
We now identify some cases where the constructed codes
in Theorem 2 and Corollaries 2-4 are optimal, using the result
of Lemmas 6 and 7.
Theorem 3. For any TUICP I(D,P ,A) given in Theorem 2
and Corollaries 2-4, with A{1,2} = P{1,2}, if l
∗ ≤ l∗1 + l
∗
2,
then the codes constructed are optimal.
Proof. From Lemmas 6 and 7, we see that l∗1 + l
∗
2 ≤
l∗(I(D,P ,A)) ≤ l∗1 + l
∗
2. Hence, we have the result. 
We illustrate the theorem using an example.
Example 4. Consider the following TUICP with M1 =
{x1, x2, x3, x4, x5, x6}, and M2 = {x5, x6, x7, x8, x9, x10}.
Hence, P1 = {x1, x2, x3, x4}, P2 = {x7, x8, x9, x10}, and
P{1,2} = {x5, x6}. The ith receiver demands xi, i ∈
{1, 2, · · · , 10}. The side-information of each receiver is:
K1 = {x2, x3, x5, x6},K2 = {x3, x4, x5, x6},
K3 = {x4, x5, x6},K4 = {x1, x5, x6},
K5 = K6 = x[10] \ {x5, x6},
K7 = {x5, x6, x8, x9, x10},K8 = {x5, x6, x9},
K9 = {x5, x6, x7, x10},K10 = {x5, x6, x7, x9}.
It can be easily verified that this problem belongs to Case
II-B. The eavesdropper has side-information given by xA =
{x2, x5, x6, x8, x9}. Hence, A1 = {2},A2 = {8, 9},A{1,2} =
{5, 6}. It can be easily verified that the following are valid
optimal codes for I(DT ,AT ), for non-empty T ∈ {1, 2}.
C1 = (x1 + x2 + x3, x2 + x3 + x4, x3 + x4),
C2 = (x7 + x9 + x10, x8 + x9), C{1,2} = (x5, x6).
Hence, l∗1 = 3, l
∗
2 = 2, and l
∗
{1,2} = 2. All the conditions given
in the Theorem 3 are satisfied. Hence, the overall optimal code
has length l∗ = 5, and is given as follows:
C1 + C{1,2} =
(x1 + x2 + x3 + x5, x2 + x3 + x4 + x6, x3 + x4),
C2 = (x7 + x9 + x10, x8 + x9).
IV. CONCLUSION
Weakly secure linear index codes are constructed for dif-
ferent classes of the TUICP using those of the sub-problems.
For some classes of the TUICP, the constructions are proven
to give optimal codes.
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